nuclear ambition

In the wake of its defeat in its eight year war with Iraq (September 1980- Agustus 1988), Iran whose ,military capabilities already include ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, has launched a major rearmament program. Given the country’s efforts to sustain its nuclear research program throughout the Iran-Iraq war and recent reports that Iraq has revitalized its quest for nuclear arms, there is reason for concern that iran, too, will launch a secret nuclear weapons effort to avoid being caught at a strategic disadvantage. Indeed, such a program, which would likely require ten years to achieve success, might already be under way. Thus, despite iran’s adherence to the non-proliferation threaty (NPT), its nuclear activities deserve continuiting scrutiny.

Background

Acceding to power in late 1979 following the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the revolutionary muslim fundamentalist govertment of ayatollah ruhollah Khomeini inherited a sizeable nuclear infrastructure, albeit one that was well short of being able to manufacture nuclear weapons. Iran’s revolutionary government has attempted to pursue various elements of the shah’s program, but many of the earlier accomplishments were dissipated during the turmoil of the Iranian revolution and the country’s subsequent war with Iraq.

Under the shah, iran’s nuclear activities has included two major components : a widely publicized commercial nuclear power program and a partially clandestine nuclear research effort. Some activities under the latter were oriented towards the development of nuclear weapons.

Commercial nuclear power program. Until it was abruptly truncated in 1979, iran’s nuclear power program was the most ambitious in the middle east. Drawing on a scientific and technical base that had been growing slowly since the 1950s, by 1974, the shah had established the atomic energy organization of iran (AEOI) to implement a grandiose nuclear energy plan that called for the construction of 23 nuclear power stations by the mid-1990s. At the time, iran had only one operating nuclear installation, a U.S. supplied research reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. Within months of its creation, however, the AEOI, backed by iran’s enormous oil wealth, was negotiating with the United States, France, and west Germany for the purchase of over a dozen large nuclear power plants. By the time of the shah’s fall in January 1979, two west german units were more than half completed at Bushehr, site preparations work had begun for two additional French supplied power reactors near Darkhnouin, and thousand of Iranian nuclear specialists were being trained in these countries and in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India

In addition, iran had negotiated an elaborate set of arrangements to ensure long term supplies of non weapons grade low enriched uranium fuel for the nuclear power plants it was building. These arrangements included extendable ten year fuel contracts with the united states, Germany and france, concluded in 1974, 1976, and 1977, respectively and purchase in 1975 of a ten percent share in a major enrichment plant being built in france by the EURODIF consortium, which included france, Belgium, spain, and Italy.

All of these reactor and fuel imports, like iran’s U.S supplied research reactor, would have been subject to international atomic energy agency (IAEA) inspection. This was required both by the supplying countries and by the fact that iran was a party to the nuclear non proliferation treaty, which stipulates that all nuclear activities within a non nuclear weapon state party must be placed under the IAEA system.

Post revolution contruction freeze. After the Chomeini government took power in late 1979 and launched its anti-modernization, muslim fundamentalist revolution, work on both the partially completed Bushehr nuclear power reactors and the Darkhouin reactor site was halted. In addition, many of the iranian technicians involved in the projects fled the country.

Tehran sought to restart work on the bushehr plants in 1984, but west germany stated it would not renew contruction activities until the Iran-Iraq war, then in its fourth year, had ended. In march 1987, iranian nuclear officials pursued contract negotiations with a consortium of west german, spanyish, and argentinian firms on restarting the Bushehr project presumably, after piece returned to the region and trough tha fall of that year, iran took premilinary steps at the construction site to prepare for renewed work on the plants. Nonetheless, trough late 1989, more than a year after the ceasefire in the Iran-Irag conflict, the project remained dormant. Moreover, additional work would be required Iraqi bombing attacks. Iran's fuel supply arrangements with the united states, france, and west germany, and its participation in the EURODIF enrichment consortium have also been in limbo since the iranian revolution.

Undisclosed uranium purchased and domestic resources. Although most aspects of the Shah's nuclear power program were well publicized, one element was not disclosed a secret contract for the purchase of natural uranium concentrate, known as 'yellowcake' from south africa. The agreement is documented in a confidential 1976 U.S State department cable, which notes :

the western press has reported that iran has signed an agreement to purchase $700 million worth of uranium from the republic of south africa and that it will invest In a south africa uranium enrichment plant. This story has been denied publicly, but in confidence an AEOI (atomic energy organization of iran) official has confirmed that there is a secret agreement to purchase uranium from south africa. It is evidently being kept under wraps at the insistence of south africa. The exact source of the ore may be in Namibia, rather than the territory of the republic itself

presumably, the south afican material was to have been shipped to the united states, west germany, or france for enrichment to make it suitable for use as fuel in iran's nuclear power plants. This would have been a normal commercial arrangement.

It is not known whether iran obtained yellowcake under this agreement during the shah's reign. If so, this material could now be in the hands of the Iranian revolutionary government. In addition, it is possible that the chomeini government, itself, has made secret uranium purchases from south Africa since coming to power, as indicated in an unconfirmed 1987 press report. iran the report state, would have had the right to purchase up to 1,000 metric tons of yellowcake annualy during this period. As a party to the NPT since 1970, iran has been required to advise the IAEA of any imports of such uranium concentrate, and in 1984 south Africa declared that it would require all of its nuclear export to be subject to IAEA requirement. Yellowcake is not subject to formal IAEA inspection, however and even if iran had notified the agency of any imports from south Africa, it could probably have diverted the material to a covert nuclear weapons program without detection. Moreover, the possibility of unreported transfers of south African uranium to iran cannot be ruled out. South African yellowcake could contribute to a future Iranian nuclear weapons effort if iran were to acquire clandestine uranium enrichment or plutonium production facilities.

Iran also may have obtained uranium dioxide secretly from Algeria. Uranium dioxide uranium that has been refined oe step beyond the yellowcake stage could serve as the raw material for the production of plutonium of highly enriched uranium if iran ultimately acquire the facilities to produce these substances. Algeria purchased a minimum of 6,600 pounds ( there metric tons ) of the material from argentina in January 1986 and U.S. official are said to believe that Algeria retransferred a portion of the uranium yo iran. Because it is more useful for the production of nuclear weapons material than yellowcake, under the IAEA safeguard system, uranium dioxide stocks are normally subject to IAEA inspection, while yellowcake stocks need only be reported to the agency. Iran would therefore have been obligated under the NPT to place the material under IAEA safeguards. U.S official were reportedly concerned, however, that the transfer was, in fact, not subject to the IAEA system and that iran, therefore, might be considering the use of the material in a possible clandestine nuclear program

iran will also soon be able to produce yellowcake domestically. In 1987, the khomeini government announced plants to set up a plant for producing uranium concentrate from uranium ore in Yazd province, the location of substancial ore deposits. As of late 1989, construction of the facility was continuing.

Inherited nuclear weapon research. While iran's nuclear power program has been beset by reverses since 1979, the nuclear research activities inherited from the shah have suffered less upheaval. Work at the tehran research center apparently continued without major interruption after khomeini took power. This mean that iran has been able to train specialists and perform experiments using the small U.S suplied research reactor, which remains under international atomic energy agency safeguards

moreover, specialists at the center have presumably had access to the research result obtained during the years of work under the shah, including the fruits of what appears to have been a three pronged undeclared nucklear weapons research effort. According to several former U.S official, one component of this effort was the investigation of nuclear weapondesign undertaken by a secret research group one knowledgeable U.S specialist stated that the unit was a 'nuclear weapons design team' whose existence so troubled U.S non proliferation aides that a then pending agreement for cooperation with iran in the areas of nuclear research and power was put on hold. Another former U.S official recalled that ' at one of their research centers we were concerned that paper studies and computer analyses of nuclear weapons were under way it appread, he continued, that they had gotten a charter from the shah. “a third U.S insider described the unit as a group doing “advanced research that didn’t look to good,” but he did not recall conclusive evidence of work being performed on nuclear arms. It is not clear when these research activities were initiated.

According to akbar etemad, the former head of the Iranian atomic energy organization, in the last years of the shah’s reign, Iranian investigators also undertook studies on the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel, a second component of research relevant to the development of nuclear arms. In 1988, an Iranian nuclear engineer who participated in this program at the Tehran research center was quoted as stating that a plutonium axtraction laboratory had been built at the facility, althoughit had not operated with plutonium bearing materials.

The third strand of weapons relevant research under the shah was an effort by the Tehran center to underwrite the development by a U.S firm of lasers supposedly capable of enriching uranium to weapons grade. The firm was headed by an American scientist, Dr. Jeffery Eerkens, who had previously worked on classified enrichment research for a U.S defense contractor. Eerkens ultimately shipped four lasers to iran, claiming on his export license application that they were intended only for laboratory plasma research. In a 1986 interview, Eerkens state that subsequent research had convinced him that his 1979 design was unworkable as a means for enrichment uranium as a number of U.S. government specialists had concluded ehen they had reviewed the 1979 export license.

Continuiting research. The status of the shah’s undeclared nuclear weapons research program remains unknown. Many nuclear expert associated with the Iranian nuclear power program fled the country after Khomeini’s ascendancy. According to the former head of the AEOI, however, more specialists working at the Tehran nuclear research center remained. It is possible that these included the experts engaged in weapons related activities. Some work on laser enrichment may also have continued, although not, apparently, based on the Eerkens units.

The Khomeini regime apparently pursued the research side of its nuclear program with some vigor. In 1984, it opened a new research center at Isfahan, for which ground had been broken under the shah. In 1987, moreover, it signed a $5.5 million contract with argentina under which the latter agreed to supply new, non weapon grade, 20 percent enriched uranium fuel for the Tehran research reactor. ( the reactor has been using five kilograms ( 11 pounds ) of weapons grade, 93 percent enriched supplied by the United States in the mid 1970s an amount inssuficient for a nuclear device but this is nearly exhausted and the unit has been able to operate only intermittently ). The agreement with argentina also provides for the training of uranium nuclear technicians at argentina’s Jose Balaseiro nuclear institute. More disturbing, however, is the possibility that the agreement may provide for the transfer of argentine uranium enrichment technology as well. In march 1988, finally, a report in the british press stated that iran was attempting to rebuild the plutonium extraction laboratory mentioned above.

Interest in nuclear arms within revolutionary government. There is also convincing evidence that in 1979 some elements of iran’s revolutionary government were interested in acquiring nuclear arms. In may of that year, during the turmoil that would soon lead to khomeini’s seizure of power, Dr. Fereidun Fesharaki, a former energy advisor to the shah, was called before Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, one of Ayatollah Khomeini’s closest advisers. Fesharaki had headed a group of government energy specialists reporting to Jamshid Amouzegar, one of the shah’s last prime ministers, which had prepared a proposal for developing nuclear arms using clandestine, dedicated facilities. Beheshti, who had acquired a copy of Fesharaki’s plan, told him, “it is your duty to build the atomic bomb for the islmic republican party. . . . our civilization is in danger and we have to have it.”

When Fesharaki explained the project would be extremely costly, Beheshti replied, “fine, but the costs are torelable and we must start. It is our duty to start